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ex parte an order directing the payment of money as a judgment
is circumscribed by the specific provisions of Section 244 of the
Domestic Relations Law. This latter provision requires an application to the court, on appropriate notice to the defendant, for
an order directing entry of an arrears judgment arising out of
a matrimonial action. Section 244 was previously held to be the
26
exclusive remedy in the enforcement of matrimonial payments. s
The primary importance of the instant case is that it is the
first to construe CPLR 2222 as inapplicable in matrimonial actions.
Thus, the provisions of CPLR 2222, which in general facilitate
and liberalize the docketing of orders as judgments are overridden by the specific provisions of section 244, which require
a hearing before the court on proper notice to the defendant. The
discretion of the court in enforcing the non-payment of orders in
a matrimonial action is unaffected by CPLR 2222, and Section
244 of the Domestic Relations Law is still the exclusive remedy.
VEHICLE AwD TRAFFIC LAW
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 253: Actual notice not necessary where
defendant gave false address.
Constructive service on a nonresident motorist pursuant to
Section 253 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law requires service on
the Secretary of State and service on the defendant at his lastknown address by registered mail. In addition, plaintiff must file
either the return receipt or notice of defendant's refusal to accept
delivery. It is well established that the import of the registered
mail and filing requirements is that the defendant must have received
270
actual notice of the service.2 69 However, in Greenwood v. White,
service was validated even though there was no actual notice.
There, the defendant, a nonresident motorist involved in an
accident in New York, gave the sheriff an improper Florida
address. The registered letter was returned marked "No such
address" "Unknown." In upholding the service, the court recognized that there was a lack of compliance with the provisions of
the statute, but nevertheless held that the defendant, by giving an
incorrect address and rendering compliance impossible, was estopped
from asserting that a return receipt had not been filed.
It appears that Greenwood is the first case to uphold constructive service pursuant to Section 253 of the Vehicle and Traffic
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Law in spite of the lack of actual notice given to the nonresident
defendant. This does not mean, however, that the prior cases
are overruled, for they are distinguishable on the facts.
In Bernardt v. Scianinanico,2 1 plaintiff sent the letter to the
address at which he believed the defendant resided. In this
case there is dictum to the effect that it is immaterial that a nonresident defendant can thwart service simply by moving and leaving
no forwarding address;2 72 actual notice is necessary. In another
case, 27 3 similar to Bernardt except for the fact that plaintiff knew
the defendant had moved, the court interpreted the statute to
require actual notice. Thus, the fact that plaintiff knew or did
not know that the defendant had moved seems to make no difference when the requirement is that of actual notice.
While Greenwood does not abrogate the actual notice interpretation of section 253, it does find a way to circumvent it by applying
the theory of estoppel. It might be that the facts in Greenwood
lend more easily to the use of estoppel, but considering the dictum
in Bernardt, it would seem that Greenwood represents a trend
toward a more realistic and non-literal reading of the requirements
of section 253.
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Misc. 2d 182, 192 N.Y.S2d 1018 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1959).

2721d. at 184, 192 N.Y.S2d at 1022.
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Baunian v. Fisher, supra note 269.

